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THE preponderant sentiment of all who participated in this valuable
conference seems to be that something can be done to lessen the
instability that has marked business investment. Perhaps thisis
simply a case of the devout agreeing on the creed or perhaps it is a
professional mirroring of a very general public desire. In any event,
the agreement was marked. Dissent, or at least something close to
dissent, seemed to come from Mr. Dean and Mr. Wright and there
was at least some uncertainty from Mr. de Chazeau and Mr. Hoad-
ley. But this questioning has enriched the conference and the entire
subject.
I have two general observations:
There was no discussion of a question that, while literally not a
part of the subject, seems to me to bear very heavily upon it: Should
the aggregate amount of business investment, or its proportion to
gross or net production, be reduced, increased, or held the same?
Since in the present state of knowledge no one could be certain of
the precise effect of any poiicy, any effort to stabilize business invest-
ment should be based on an assumption as to which way the benefit
of the doubt should go. Granted that the effect of any policy cannot
be exactly known, would it be better for business investment to be
reduced or increased? This seems to me to be an extremely vital
question, which must be answered in formulating policy on regu-
larization. I shall return to this subject later.
My second general observation is that we must more clearly
identify the kind of instability with which we are concerned. There
were in the papers and the discussion many examples of vagueness
or differences on this subject. For example, Mr. Dean held that the
key to instability "is managerial discretion as to the timing of capital
expenditure," while Mr. de Chazeau seemed to attribute it also to
the growing range of discretionary expenditure in a country of high
standard of living and Mr. Hicks held that, at least in his business,
capital expenditures inevitably will be made when cash is available
and there is high demand for product.
Viewing the same subject differently, there seemed little atten-
tion to what cycle is under discussion. Preponderantly, the discus-
sion seemed to contemplate one homogeneous, standardized business
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cycle and the only exception was some reference to a building cycle.
But there are various other types of cycles with different durations,
including among the more prominent ones the Kitchin or forty-month
cycle, the Juglar, and the Kondratieff. Regularization efforts might
be quite different in type and timing among different businesses
affected by different kinds of cycles and conceivably there could be
some flatly contradictory efforts and conclusions.
Or viewing the same subject in still another way, there is the
question of what is meant now; most of the discussion looked down
from Olympia. But policy formulation at any given time would
have to start from a specific point on earth and in the calendar and
would probably have to have some conception of the future from
that point. A tone of bearishness came out a few times but it was
muted and incidental.
So in several different senses exploration and clarification of the
meaning and implications of instability seem desirable.
So much for the general observations. Let me now turn to some
more specific points.
Disagreement or lack of agreement is very widespread among the
papers and in the discussion. This existed between speakers and
writers both on specific points and on the object and purpose of the
Conference—and sometimes individuals seemed to disagree with
themselves. The number of instances is so great that I will attempt
to touch on oniy a few of the more important ones and that more by
way of illustration, to show the basis of a conclusion that I shall
reach, than as a summary or critique.
The responsibility or appropriate role of both business and govern-
ment in the regularization of business was in dispute. Dr. Schmidt
seems to believe that business can do a great deal, both in the
regularization of investment, and in the regularization of total
demand, on which his paper focused most. Dr. de Chazeau feels
that the firm must be strictly attentive to its own interests but that
these interests can and should be interpreted very widely. A number
of participants feel that the business firm has considerable desire
to help in regularization but must first be answerable to its owners.
Among the most dubious were Mr. Hoadley, Mr. Morehouse, and
Mr. Dean—the last named referring to "the profitless burden of
stabilizing the economy." A number of participants, particularly
those from private business organizations, expressed unfriendliness
and distrust for any effort by government to do anything. Others in
turn feel that if anything worthwhile is to be accomplished in regu-
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larization it will have to be done preponderantly or exclusively by
the government. Mr. Hart appeared to hold this feeling with par-
ticular intensity. The number of things that it was suggested the
government could do to contribute to regularization was very large,
running through taxation, financing, monetary policy, regulation,
investment, and fixing of goals. Some of those who looked toward
government as the only hope rather strongly deprecated the possi-
bilities for action by private business on its own and there was more
than a hint of questioning the good faith and intent of private
business firms.
I hope I may be forgiven a little criticism. This controversy about
and between business and government seems to me a false trail—and
I almost said a false god, for it has almost become a god to some.
To my mind, all who are engaging in this controversy are doing
themselves and the subject of regularization a disservice. The fact
is that both business and government are fallible and imperfect in-
struments. Both have been parties to major mistakes in the past and
both have aggravated booms and depressions—and never more so
than at this very moment. There is a great deal of room for humility
on both sides and there is no justification for some of the other less
desirable attitudes. Both business and government are units in which
society is organized. Both are as responsible and act in as good faith
as much of the time as fallible beings have so far been able to.
Society needs and must have both units of organization, and both
are appropriate units of social and economic organization. Both can
do a better job than has been done so far. If greater regularization
or other meritorious goals are to be approached, both business and
government to my mind must contribute. Here endeth the ex-
hortation.
Another example of lack of agreement lay in what is conceived to
be the planning horizon of business firms. The period ahead for
which business makes plans is conceived to be a widely different
interval by different individuals. Dean suggested that one, or at
most two, years is the period ahead for which plans are made. More-
house said that among public utilities there is a one-year budget, a
medium-term budget of three to five years, and sometimes a long-
term plan of ten years or more. The paper by Jacoby and Weston
and that by De Chazeau refer to planning periods covering up to
twenty years ahead.
A third major area of disagreement that I should like to mention
illustratively concerns the steps that might be taken to try to attain
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regularization. Wide differences are inevitable because of the dif-
fering views held as to how the process of business investment works
and what the determining factors in it are. Thus Dean and More-
house describe an elaborate and detailed capital budgeting proced-
ure as the process by which business investment decisions are made,
whereas De Chazeau in his questioning found little trace of such
rationality and Healy positively asserts that irrationality seems to
exist. Jacoby and Weston are to be found somewhere between these
extreme views. Hoadley, Schmidt, and Knauth preponderantly stress
factors affecting total demand and its influence on business invest-
ment. Still other speakers go to a wider range: Boatwright empha-
sizes international influences, Hart stresses government, and a num-
ber of writers and speakers stress financial influences.
As a final illustration, there are differing views of the importance
of the interest rate, a revelation hardly surprising at a meeting of
economists.
My suspicion is that the apparent lack of agreement in all four
of these illustrative cases—and it would be possible to add a large
number of others—is an almost classical case of the blind men
describing the elephant. I say this not in disrespect to the writers
and speakers but in hearty recognition of the vastness and com-
plexity of the problem of business investment and its determinants.
Business investment, in fact, encompasses a tremendous variety of
operations in a tremendous variety of businesses. And these opera-
tions are carried on by these firms under conditions that vary sig-
nificantly over time. It is almost inevitable that different features
shoul.d seem most prominent, characteristic, and determining ac-
cording to what desk the observer has been sitting at over what
time period.
But the apparent array of differences is also, I strongly suspect, a
very marked exaggeration of the views that are held by the members
of the Conference. Some have emphasized one aspect and some
another to a degree where disagreement appears to exist; further
discussion and identification of subject and assumptions probably
would greafly reduce the apparent disagreement. Furthermore, this
conference itself probably has brought increased understanding
among the members so that I can well imagine that differences are
less now than they were when the Conference was planned. But
differences doubtless still exist and I shall return to a further con-
sideration of them a little later.
488APPRAISAL
Let me now turn to my specific conclusions and suggestions on
the subject. There are five.
1. I feel very strongly that in any effort toward regularization of
business investment the utmost care should be taken to avoid any
possibility that the total investment, excluding inventories, would
be reduced over the course of the cycle. Since any policy on the
subject cannot be expected to achieve a precise result, the benefit
of the doubt should fall in favor of expanding the total of business
investment, excluding inventories, over the cycle and against any
possibility of curtailing that total. This leads me to suggest that
policy should concentrate on boosting the total of business invest-
ment, excluding inventories, in recession and slump, and should be
very cautious about attempting curtailment in boom. I am aware
that there are some semantics involved but surely my purport is
clear.
2. The best scripture for action to my mind may be taken from
the book of Abramovitz: "Encouraging the kinds of price changes
that induce countercyclical speculation." Abramovitz at this point is
talking about inventory operations. But his idea, to my mind, can
and should be broadened to encompass the entire subject. All busi-
ness investment is forward-looking and, in a nondeprecatory sense,
speculative. The fundamental problem, therefore, is how to stimulate
this form of speculation in a slump. This can be accomplished, it
seems to me, by cutting the risk believed to be involved in such
investment and increasing the expectation of reward. Action in this
regard would have to come from all parties that influence risk and
reward: government, suppliers of funds, and users of funds. This is
thus a demonstration of how essential is the participation of all
major parties in the problem. I shall not attempt to specify the
actions that are needed, but a good working list certainly could be
developed from the papers that have been given at this conference.
3. Businessmen should, and should be expected to, act and think
like businessmen. In my opinion, any effort by them to put on a
different mantle and forget their primary interest in producing, or
facilitating the production and distribution of, goods would be a
grave mistake and would be confusing rather than constructive. But
while businessmen should not try, or be expected, to forget their
real interests, they should reexamine carefully what those interests
are. I have no doubt that, as has been repeatedly suggested here,
the result will be the discovery that those interests are much broader
than some executives have yet realized.
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4. Financial institutions should be encouraged in the constructive
road toward regularization on which they already are far advanced.
The experience studies made by the National Bureau and others,
with support from the chief financial groups, provide abundant
evidence that the riskiest investments are made toward the top of
the boom and that the safest investments are made in the slump.
Thus if financial institutions become a little more cautious in booms
and a little less scared in slumps, they will evidently be acting in
their own direct interest, and in addition, they will be making a
contribution toward the regularization of investment.
Use of newly developed devices of investment holds much promise
of contracyclical contribution. The purchase-and-lease-back tech-
nique seems especially hopeful because by this method both plant
and equipment can be produced and made available to firms at a
rental cost at the time when they might wish and need it but might
be reluctant to make the investment. This would probably also be
the best time for the financial institutions to make the investment.
The much broader use of amortization is now working against
overindebtedness. Greater flexibility is offered business firms by
directly negotiated term loans than by the broadly distributed issues
previously widely used. There is promise, too, in the general atti-
hide of financial institutions that when debtors are in distress it is
wiser to work with them than to sell them out.
The regulatory authorities could make a valuable contribution
toward the objective by improving valuation requirements. The
present system requires large charges to surplus in periods of reces-
sion and slump; experience suggests these are unwarranted when
they arise simply from price fluctuations in perfectly sound in-
vestments.
I believe that in all this I am agreeing with the excellent paper
by Jacoby and Weston—and perhaps going still further. I most
vigorously agree with them also that the central bank can and must
play an important role in encouraging the financial institutions to
act in a countercyclical manner.
5. I want to say as forcefully as I can that regularization of
business investment is a matter of bits and pieces. As in so many
cases, search for the solution must inevitably fail. There is no single
simple defect to cure and thus produce perfection. The subject, as
emphasized before, is of great complexity and almost infinite variety.
Progress toward greater regularization must be made by the use of
the great variety of bits and pieces that these discussions have shown
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to be available. We need to utilize everything instead of trying to
concentrate on one thing.
Finally, let me make three recommendations:
The first is that the planning committee for this conference have
an index made of the contents of these papers, which constitute an
invaluable mass of information and suggestions on problems, and
considerations in the regularization of business investment.
My second recommendation is that the National Bureau, or some
group, undertake a study, appraisal, and evaluation of the defenses
that now exist against extreme depression or economic disintegra-
tion. In the years since the disintegration of the 1930's, a massive set
of defenses has been erected. It has not been tested and it has not
been objectively appraised. Among businessmen and investors, the
great lurking fear is that another disintegration will overtake us.
That fear is so great that it constitutes a major enemy of regulariza-
tion of business investment in either a physical or a financial sense.
Objective, authoritative examination and appraisal would constitute
a great service and a contribution of considerable importance toward
regularization.
Third, a major systematic study of the process of business invest-
ment is needed. The lack of agreement, or lack of understanding, or
lack of familiarity, manifested in these discussions demonstrates, as
I suggested earlier, an insufficient understanding of the actual
process. Now we members of this conference are not the only in-
terested parties. I am certain, and it has been stated here, that many
businessmen are extremely interested in lessening economic insta-
bility. Evidently, we need more information about business invest-
ment and the factors determining it. I suggest that a major project
be organized for this purpose. I have no doubt that many business
managements could be enlisted to open their books and their minds
fully on the subject and I should think that funds to finance such
a study could surely be raised from the foundations or other sources.
Over a period of time, which might even be several years, the factors
affecting business investment could be identified and quantified, and
the lines of policy necessary for all the groups that are influential in
the process could be clearly identified and demonstrated.
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